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the social structures that shape who has (more) power to 
deceive or to let others perform.
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Introduction
Many contemporary ICTs seem to afford experiences and 
raise ethical questions that are often framed with terms such 
as “virtual reality”, “illusion”, and “deception”. In particu-
lar, computer games, virtual reality, and augmented reality 
technologies are seen as creating the illusion of a differ-
ent, “virtual” world, and some robots—especially so-called 
“social robots”—are seen as deceiving users into thinking 
that they are real persons, that they are companions, that 
they are animals, that they can speak, that they can feel, 
and so on.
For instance, there are now many machines that speak, 
such as speaking robots and speaking computer programs 
and apps. Consider robots such as Nao or Pepper (Soft-
bank), apps such as Google Assistant or Siri (Apple), or 
new devices such as Amazon Echo’s Alexa. These machines 
and interfaces create the illusion that one speaks with a per-
son. Is this ethical? Does it constitute cases of deception? 
Virtual reality technologies are also getting more common. 
In a recent interview in New Scientist, Metzinger warned 
that ‘In VR environments, we can be fooled into thinking 
that we are our avatars.’ (Ananthaswamy 2016). Comment-
ing on Second Life, Pasquinelli (2010) has identified three 
illusions in VR: ‘the illusion that the artificial world is real, 
the illusion of non-mediation, and the illusion of being in the 
virtual environment.’ (p. 201) She has raised the question if 
and how this illusion is ethically different from other kinds 
Abstract Contemporary ICTs such as speaking machines 
and computer games tend to create illusions. Is this ethically 
problematic? Is it deception? And what kind of “reality” do 
we presuppose when we talk about illusion in this context? 
Inspired by work on similarities between ICT design and the 
art of magic and illusion, responding to literature on decep-
tion in robot ethics and related fields, and briefly considering 
the issue in the context of the history of machines, this paper 
discusses these questions through the lens of stage magic 
and illusionism, with the aim of reframing the very question 
of deception. It investigates if we can take a more positive 
or at least morally neutral view of magic, illusion, and per-
formance, while still being able to understand and criticize 
the relevant phenomena, and if we can describe and evaluate 
these phenomena without recourse to the term “deception” 
at all. This leads the paper into a discussion about metaphys-
ics and into taking a relational and narrative turn. Replying 
to Tognazzini, the paper identifies and analyses two meta-
physical positions: a narrative and performative non-dualist 
position is articulated in response to what is taken to be a 
dualist, in particular Platonic, approach to “deception” phe-
nomena. The latter is critically discussed and replaced by a 
performative and relational approach which avoids a distant 
“view from nowhere” metaphysics and brings us back to the 
phenomena and experience in the performance relation. The 
paper also reflects on the ethical and political implications 
of the two positions: for the responsibility of ICT designers 
and users, which are seen as co-responsible magicians or co-
performers, and for the responsibility of those who influence 
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of make believe such as children games (p. 205) In discus-
sions about games, there is the question if violence in games 
is ethically problematic, and, more generally, whether digital 
games are mere entertainment or can change people’s dis-
positions (see for instance Sparrow et al. 2015)—questions 
which can, and are often, related to issues regarding illusions 
and reality. And several authors in the field of robot ethics 
and machine ethics have argued that it is ethically problem-
atic to give robots to children or to elderly people since this 
would create the illusion that the robot is a real nanny or par-
ent or that it really is an animal that needs care. For instance, 
in the context of robot ethics in health care, Sparrow and 
Sparrow (2006) have argued the use of robots as companions 
or carers is akin to deception, since ‘robots are premised on 
people believing that robots are something that they are not’ 
(p. 148) and since ‘failure to apprehend the world accurately 
is itself a (minor) moral failure’ and since our well-being 
is not served by us merely believing that we are cared for, 
loved, etc., ‘when in fact these beliefs are false’ (p. 155). In 
other words, the argument is that this use of robots deceives, 
and deception is morally wrong since we should have an 
accurate view of the world and well-being is only served by 
true care, true love, and so on; we should not be deceived 
about ‘the robots’ real nature’ (p. 155). Sharkey and Sharkey 
(2010) have argued that use of robots as nannies is deceiving 
children. While they argue that deception is not harmful in 
itself—they give the example of the puppeteer who ‘creates 
the illusion that the puppets are interacting with each other 
and the audience’ (p. 172)—it is harmful ‘when it is used to 
lure a child into a false relationship with a robot and when 
it leads parents to overestimate the capabilities of a robot’ 
(p. 173). Furthermore, while recognizing benefits of robots 
such as Paro for social experience (Kidd et al. 2006), Turkle 
has criticized ‘our culture of simulation’ (Turkle 2010). In 
Alone Together (2011) she has reported experiences people 
have with robots, and has argued that robots are designed in 
such a way that they trigger us to ‘fool ourselves’ (Turkle 
2011, p. 20). Computers pretend to understand us, but what 
they do is mere ‘performance’ (p. 26). Robots only give us 
the illusion of meaning; ‘they don’t mean anything at all’ 
(p. 124). We seek love, but our machines only give us ‘per-
formances of love’ (p. 138). They offer ‘the performance of 
emotion’ (p. 286). It is also interesting in the light of the sub-
sequent discussion in this paper that she starts her book with 
a quote from Plato’s Republic: ‘Everything that deceives 
may be said to enchant.’ (Plato quoted in Turkle 2011, front 
matter). Clearly, deception seems a central issue here.
It is hard not to be sympathetic to, and agree with, these 
descriptions and evaluations. Who wants a false view of 
the world? Who wants fake love? At first sight, their views 
seem very reasonable and in accordance with common intui-
tions, which I share. However, in this paper I engage in the 
philosophical exercise of questioning the assumptions that a 
discussions in terms of “deception”, “the real”, and similar 
notions is the best way to conceptualize, understand, and 
evaluate these problems. The paper aims not to provide a 
different answer, but to reframe the question. In particular, 
I investigate (1) if it is possible to take a more positive or at 
least morally neutral view on deception, illusion, and perfor-
mance, without losing the possibility of critical evaluation, 
and what such a position would look like, (2) if it is possible 
to describe and evaluate these phenomena and experiences 
without reference to the language of deception at all and 
without involving a metaphysics of the real, and (3) what it 
would mean to take a relational and narrative approach to 
the problem.
In addition, I aim to draw some conclusions for the 
responsibility of designers, but also the responsibility of 
users. With regard to the former, let me note already at this 
point that the phenomena under discussion here are not 
always intended by designers. As has often been observed, 
illusions and deceptions also occur with technologies that 
are not designed to create such illusions and deceptions, for 
instance the Roomba (Sung et al. 2007; see also Scheutz 
2011) or Packbot (Carpenter 2016). Yet this does not 
make the challenges regarding deception phenomena and 
the design of ICTs less urgent. On the contrary, it raises 
the question which I ask later on in this paper even more 
urgently: given these phenomena, how can designers take 
up responsibility for their design and its intended or non-
intended illusions?
However, let me first explain my starting point in terms 
of approach. One way to respond to these developments and 
phenomena, both on the part of computer researchers and 
on the part of philosophers, is to take immediately a norma-
tive and defensive position, and to say that computer sci-
ence and related fields are not about creating illusions and/
or should not aim at this. The mentioned ethical positions go 
into that direction in so far as their arguments are based on 
the assumption that creating illusions is bad in the context 
of social robotics, or at least in the specific cases mentiond. 
While of course their work cannot and should not be reduced 
to this assumption and most authors recognize that there 
are also advantages to deception, they seem to share this 
point about deception and its link with thinking in terms of 
reality/illusion.
However, to say that ICTs and robotics—in particular 
social robotics—sometimes creates deception and illusion 
seems not to contribute much to understanding the phenom-
ena. If what goes on here is deception, what would be a non-
deceptive design and use of this technology? What exactly 
do we mean by “deception” in this context? Moreover, tak-
ing such a position may be perceived as accusing roboti-
cists of unethical behaviour. This is not very helpful with 
regard to trying to collaboratively find out how we—people 
from the humanities and social sciences as well as robotics 
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researchers—can improve the ethical quality of design and 
use of ICTs.
In this paper I explore what I believe to be a more con-
structive and potentially more productive route: to pause 
the normative firework and first try to better understand the 
phenomena. This can be done in various ways. For instance, 
it is common within the human-robot interaction literature 
to refer to anthropomorphization and animism. Scheutz, for 
instance, has argued that perceived autonomy, in combina-
tion with the human tendency to anthropomorphize, results 
in unidirectional emotional bonds between humans and 
social robots, in which humans form a “relationship” with 
the robot but the robot lacks any capacity to do so, indeed 
does not care at all about humans. This, Scheutz argues, 
opens up many doors to exploitation (Scheutz 2011) and 
Musial (2016) has argued that animation is part of magi-
cal thinking which plays a role in empathetic relations with 
robots. However, it is questionable if labels such as “anthro-
pomorphization”, “animism”, and even “magical thinking” 
used in this way really help to better understand the relevant 
phenomena: they seem to merely redescribe the phenom-
ena without adding much new insights (Musial may be an 
exception, in so far as there is an attempt to link to a broader 
discussion about culture and religion). Furthermore, descrip-
tion of phenomena by means of psychological terms and 
theory, as a modern-scientific gesture, takes a lot of distance 
from the concrete relation between robot and user/observer, 
which according to the relational approach I will introduce 
later in this paper is problematic. Finally, clearly this argu-
ment relies once again on deception: robots only pretend 
to care, we use them as a source of meaning but they are 
not, etc. But what is this deception and illusion, and why 
exactly is it bad? It is worth further examining the mean-
ing of deception and illusion, which can be done by philo-
sophical conceptual work. In this paper I proceed by further 
exploring similarities between the design of these ICTs and 
(other) ways of creating illusions, and by using this as a basis 
for philosophical and ethical reflection.
In doing so, I shall not discuss general links between 
magic and technology, but focus on design and use of ICTs. 
For instance, in anthropology Gell (1994) has argued that 
magic is a “commentary” on ‘technical strategies in pro-
duction, reproduction, and psychological manipulation’ 
(p. 8) and that magic is an ‘ideal technology’ in the sense 
that it does not have the costs and disadvantageous of real 
production such as struggle and effort (p. 9). Elsewhere he 
also pointed out that technology has the power of enchant-
ment (Gell 1994). This work is relevant to understanding 
and evaluating contemporary ICTs, which aim at reducing 
those costs and which is often used to enchant the world (see 
also Coeckelbergh 2017). I will return briefly to Gell’s work 
when discussing the political implications of the approach 
I will develop. But within the limited space of this paper I 
shall focus on responding to work that directly addresses 
design of ICTs and its link to magic and illusionism, in par-
ticular Tognazzini’s seminal paper on the topic.
First, I show how this direction of research can be sup-
ported by existing work within the field of ICT, includ-
ing human–computer interaction, which already helpfully 
explored similarities between what illusionists and magi-
cians do, on the one hand, and what developers of ICT sys-
tems, human–computer interfaces, etc. do. This sometimes 
includes asking ethical questions. I also point to a long his-
tory of machines and computing, which always included 
stage performances and acts showing off the “magic” of new 
technologies, ranging from the “Mechanical Turk” in the late 
eighteenth century to Apple presentations and advertisement 
video’s on social media today. Moreover, there are many 
contemporary technologies such as virtual reality technolo-
gies that directly and openly aim at creating an illusion.
Second, I distinguish between on the one hand a Platonic 
position which maintains a strict distinction between reality 
and illusion, and on the other hand positions that are critical 
of this metaphysics and take a different approach. I show that 
these different positions lead to different ethical questions. 
I pay particular attention to, and articulate and construct, an 
approach that takes seriously the pervasiveness of technol-
ogy, rejects Platonic dualism regarding the question about 
deception (indeed the Platonic framing of the question in 
terms of deception), uses concepts of process, performance, 
and narrative to understand the relations between designers, 
users, and technology (and hence, in contrast to Turkle, uses 
the term performance in a morally neutral sense), consid-
ers a non-modern position according to which animism is 
not necessarily problematic, and asks about the role of user, 
which often remains relatively passive in standard models of 
magic as stage performance. I argue that, if combined with 
a relational view, this direction leads to an approach centred 
on understanding the experience in the performance (pos-
sibly co-performance) and its consequences, which avoids 
a distant “view from nowhere” and discussions about the 
properties of the robot, the metaphysics of the real, and so 
on.
Third, I reflect on the implications of this analysis for 
the responsibility of ICT designers and users. What does 
it mean for their ethical responsibility to see for instance 
roboticists as illusionists? And what does it mean for the 
ethical responsibility of the user? I argue that designers 
have a responsibility for designing the role and narrative 
related to their artefact, and indeed for designing the (co-)
performance, but that the performance and the narrative cre-
ated are also the responsibility of the user(s) since they also 
co-create it. This means that the design should be “open” 
enough to enable a role of the user as co-responsible co-
magician. Moreover, keeping in mind phenomena such as 
attachment to Roomba, I argue that both users and designers 
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should take into account that there may be unintended conse-
quences of their authorings and performances, which need to 
be revealed and evaluated. I reflect on the role of technology 
in these performances, emphasizing that it involves humans 
and non-humans.
Finally, I explore the implications of this approach for 
politics: what would a politics of deception and a politics of 
performance mean? I argue that some have more power than 
others to deceive and to perform (or let others perform for 
them), and that these questions should be discussed in rela-
tion to the democratic ideal. I also ask if perhaps the term 
deception can be saved, especially in discussions about the 
design of machines.
Computer science, robotics, and the art of magic
While some people in the fields of computer science, robot-
ics, and AI may be resistant to thinking of their research in 
terms of the art of magic and illusionism—indeed in terms 
of arts and crafts at all—this need not be the case at all. In 
fact, many people in the field have actively explored this link 
and have drawn conclusions for design. An interesting and 
seminal paper in this area is Bruce Tognazzini’s ‘Principles, 
Techniques, and Ethics of Stage Magic and their Application 
to Human Interface Design’ (1993), which makes a direct 
link between what happens in stage magic and in the design 
of human–computer interfaces.
Tognazzini, an experienced software designer and con-
sultant who worked for Apple, Sun Microsystems, and 
WebMD, claims that there is a long tradition of designing 
and presenting illusions, that it is a craft and act that works 
with apparatus, and that the design of human–computer 
interfaces can learn from its principles. Particularly helpful 
for the present discussion is his analysis of magic as involv-
ing two acts and realities:
Actually, there are two simultaneous acts performed 
in magic: the one the magician actually does—the 
magician’s reality—and the one the spectators per-
ceive—the spectators’ reality: The magician’s reality 
consists of all the sleights of hand and manipulation 
of gimmicked devices that make up the prosaic reality 
of magic. The spectators’ reality, given a sufficiently 
competent magician, is entirely different: an alternate 
reality in which the normal laws of nature are repeat-
edly defied, a reality where the magician, as well as his 
or her tricks, appear supernatural (Tognazzini 1993, 
p. 357)
To create this alternate reality, the magicians needs 
knowledge of psychology and needs to have technique 
and technologies. Techniques include simulation and 
dissimulation, careful handling of objects and attention to 
detail, and the manipulation of time and space. Tognazzini 
gives examples of how Macintosh programmers used these 
techniques, or at least can be interpreted as having used these 
techniques. We can easily expand his examples to today’s 
speaking devices, human-like robots, and communicative 
apps: they too create an illusion, for instance the illusion of 
personhood, but in reality it’s a “trick”, and knowledgeable 
and skilled developers of technology know the tricks, the 
techniques, the way things really work—literally “behind the 
screen”. They know the craft of code writing and the know-
how of hardware development. As magicians and illusion-
ists, they create interfaces and hide the real, technological 
face of the machine. What is required ethically, according 
to Tognazzini, is that they are honest about this. (p. 361) (I 
will return to this.)
This use and creation of technologies as a way to create 
illusions has a long history, which is as much a history of 
inventions as it is a history of shows and performances. The 
illusion is created during use, and is especially strong dur-
ing the first use or presentation of the device. Consider for 
instance some examples from the history of machines, robots 
and automata. In ancient times, machines were already used 
to bring actors playing god onto the stage or technology 
was used to create moving and talking statues. There were 
already mechanical automata in ancient Greece and in medi-
eval times. Japan had automata in the seventeenth century. 
In eighteenth century Europe, automata were used in perfor-
mances to create illusions, for instance flute playing, eating, 
and chess playing (the so-called “Turk”). And today new 
robots or smart devices are often presented in a way that is 
very similar to such performances and magic shows. But not 
only robots and automata were and are “magic”; all kinds 
of ICTs are used and presented in this way, and especially 
when they are new they seem magic. To extend Tognazzini’s 
Macintosch example from use to the presentation of devices: 
from the 1970s until now, Apple has always done shows, 
performances, to show off new technology and the “magic” 
of Apple computers. Consider for instance the 1984 presen-
tation of the Macintosch which featured a speaking computer 
and a graphical interface, or the presentation of the iPhone 
in 2007, which was also a performance by magician-inno-
vator Steve Jobs. Today many advertisements for new high 
tech products play on the magic of their devices. Moreover, 
returning to use, it is clear that today many new devices have 
the explicit goal of creating illusion, such as virtual reality 
(VR) and augmented or alternate reality technology. (Below 
I will give the example of Pokémon Go.)
More researchers in computer science have studied decep-
tion and magic, and have also pointed to productive uses of 
the lessons of magic and illusionism for the design of ICTs. 
For instance, Marshall et al. (2010) argued that whereas 
some kinds of deceptions may be unethical, in interactive 
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performances of computing there is ‘a need to create a sense 
of magical illusion as part of an entertaining and engaging 
user experience’ (p. 567). They focused in particular on ‘mag-
ical interactions’, on people that trick one another by using 
computers, involving misdirecting attention and creating false 
expectations. They proposed to broaden the human–computer 
interaction agenda ‘to consider the currently unfamiliar idea 
that the active deception of one user by another can be a valid 
approach to interaction design’ (p. 576). Furthermore, like 
Rowe (2007) and Adar et al. (2013) they also point to what 
may considered to be an ethical use of deception: computer 
systems that create deceptions in order to maintain security. 
Hence Adar et al. suggest that there may be ‘benevolent 
deception, deception aimed at benefitting the user as well as 
the developer’ (Adar et al. 2013, abstract).
I agree with the authors that more needs to be said about 
(the ethics of) deception, and that deception should not be a 
taboo in the field. But from a philosophical point of view, the 
distinction between two realities which seems to underlie the 
deception discussion needs further elaboration and criticism.
Reality, illusion, and more: two metaephysical 
and ethical positions
Two realities and the ethics of honesty
We could interpret Tognazzini’s distinction between two 
realities, a real one (the reality of the magician) and a fake, 
illusory one (the reality of the spectator) as a familiar meta-
physical position that goes back at least as far as Plato: there 
is reality versus illusion, there are appearances versus the 
real. Plato’s metaphor and myth/narrative of the cave, which 
he famously presented in his Republic (514–520a), is appli-
cable here, with the magician in the role of the artist-crafts-
man creating the illusions by using all kinds of objects (wall, 
fire, objects) and in the role of the all-knowing philosopher 
who can distinguish between appearances and reality. The 
prisoners, by contrast, are the spectators who live in illusion. 
The only difference with Plato’s metaphor seems to be that at 
least some spectators of stage magic have the desire to find 
out about reality, want to understand the tricks. (Note that 
this metaphor of the prisoner also explains why there is often 
an adversarial relationship between magician and spectator, 
as recognized in the literature mentioned above: the specta-
tor wants to find out, but the magician forces her magic onto 
the spectators. This could be seen as an issue concerning 
power, which I will explore at the end of my paper).
The normative implication of such a position, then, is the 
imperative to keep reality and illusion separate. Perhaps it 
is fine to be a “prisoner” of the magician during the show, 
but one should know that it is only an illusion. And indeed 
Tognazzini proposes an ethics of honesty: during the show 
spectators are provided with an illusion and should think that 
the magician is supernatural, but outside the theatre magi-
cians do not claim to be supernatural. In other words, we 
should maintain a distinction between illusion and reality:
the magician is not supernatural; the character he plays 
is. The computer is not capable of human intelligence 
and warmth; the character we create is. People will not 
end up feeling deceived and used when they discover, 
as they must ultimately, that the computer is nothing 
but a very fast idiot (Tognazzini 1993, p. 361)
For use of ICTs, this position thus means that users of for 
instance robots, talking machines, virtual reality technol-
ogy, and games, should be made aware—through design, 
advertisement, and other means—that what they experience 
is an illusion, created by science and technology. It is fine to 
create illusion, for instance through a virtual reality device, 
as long as it is clear to the user that it is an illusion. Devices 
need then be designed and promoted in such a way that the 
user gains or retains this awareness, even if during use of 
the device this awareness may be temporarily suspended. 
Compare again to the show of the magician: outside the 
theatre, we know that it is a show and that it is deception. 
Thus, we can conclude from this position that the magi-
cian or designer should work in such a way that the user is 
provided with an illusion, but at the same time knows that 
the reality created by the computer is not real or that the 
computer, robot, app, etc. is technology, not a person.
This ethical position is in line with positions that see tech-
nology is a mere instrument and should be a mere instru-
ment. For instance, Bryson (2010) argued robots are not per-
sons, they are there to work for us, they are slaves. Consider 
also again the view I mentioned before by referring to the 
Sparrows: that robots should be designed as what they are, 
rather than pretending to be what they are not. This seems 
a reasonable position. Tognazzini’s interpretation of what 
happens in stage magic and illusionism is compelling, as is 
his application to interface design and—by expansion—to 
the design of ICTs. His ethics is also rather attractive since 
it is in line with many ordinary intuitions we have about 
technologies such as robots.
However, I am afraid we must complicate matters now. 
The rationale for doing so is twofold. First, when we look at 
experience and use of ICTs, we see that the phenomenology 
of this use and experience is sometimes difficult to describe 
in dualist terms, in terms of two realities. When we use the 
internet (e.g. through our smartphones), play games, talk 
to robots, etc. it seems rather than what we call “real” and 
“virtual” are mixed. Floridi (2015), for instance, has used 
the term “onlife” for emphasizing how it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to describe our use of internet as being about 
“online” versus “offline”. Similarly, we could say that when 
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we interact with smart devices, human-like autonomous 
robots, voice interfaces such as Google Assistant, and so on, 
we do not generally experience this as “illusion” in contrast 
to “reality”. Now according to the Platonic position, this only 
shows our imprisonment in appearances. It shows how the 
companies developing these tools manage to give us the fake 
as opposed to the real. It is a lie. While this argument seems 
compelling, and can again be combined with an ethics of 
honesty (which could be developed in terms of a virtue eth-
ics), it is not entirely satisfactory. Is our experience that there 
is only one experience and reality when we use these devices, 
that they are part of and entangled with our lives, entirely 
misguided? Or shall we at least also consider other ways to 
conceptualize what is going on, while still being able to criti-
cize certain phenomena such as attachment to machines?
Second, in the history of philosophy, especially the his-
tory of twentieth century philosophy, we see that the Pla-
tonic position is far from uncontested. There are all kinds 
of other, less dualist or nondualist metaphysics available. 
Perhaps there are only appearances, perhaps there is no-one 
behind the mask and no “real” behind the curtain. Perhaps 
there are multiple realities, or different perspectives, or dif-
ferent levels of description, or different levels of abstraction 
(in the context of thinking about ICTs see Floridi’s philoso-
phy of information, for instance). Or perhaps there is just 
one reality—natural or informational, for instance. These 
are all distinct metaphysical positions which are highly rel-
evant to discussions about the ethics of ICTs. We can con-
nect them to discussions in the history of philosophy, for 
instance anti-Platonic positions in Nietzsche, Dewey, and so 
on. In this paper, I do not have the space to discuss these at 
length, let alone to engage with the history of contemporary 
philosophy to which these positions must be related. For 
my purposes, it will suffice that I try to construct a plausible 
non-dualist alternative to the Platonic position articulated 
above, a working approach so to speak. This approach is 
influenced by, and will be connected and integrated with, 
relational ways of thinking in contemporary machine ethics 
(Coeckelbergh 2012, 2014; Coeckelbergh and Gunkel 2014), 
and further applies process and performance oriented think-
ing (Coeckelbergh 2017) to thinking about technology. Then 
I will discuss its ethical implications.
Magic times, performances with machines, 
and narrative game technologies: an alternative, 
non‑platonic position using the concepts process, 
narrative, and performance
Let me construct an alternative position by using three con-
cepts: process, narrative, and performance.1
First, the Platonic metaphysics, at least as presented 
above, is remarkably static. If we describe what goes on 
in stage magic and in use of ICTs in terms of two realities, 
what is left out is process. As becomes clear from descrip-
tions of stage magic in the literature cited above, illusion-
ism is a temporal affair, in take place in time, and it is even 
a particular configuration of time, in the sense that there is 
the experience time of the spectator (in a dualist framework 
called “subjective” time or duréee in Bergson’s terms) and 
the experience time of the magician/designer/programmer/
hacker etc. (“objective”, scientific time). If we shed dualistic 
thinking, however, we simply have different times and expe-
riences that intersect (or not), without giving necessarily 
ontological priority to one of them. For Tognazzini, magi-
cians manipulate time in the following way:
Magicians use two techniques to offset the actual 
time a trick (the essential working of the apparatus) 
takes place from the time of the spectators think it 
takes place: Anticipation, where the magician does 
the trick early, before spectators begin looking for it, 
and Premature Consumption, where the magician does 
the trick late, after spectators assume it has already 
occurred (Tognazzini 1993, p. 359)
Thus, there are indeed different times: the time of the 
magician and the time of the spectator. With regard to ICTs, 
this means that there is the time and timing of the program 
known by the designer and there is the time and timing of 
the user. But instead of seeing these different times in terms 
of what “really” goes on versus what is illusion, or instead of 
‘offsetting time of reality from time of illusion’ and speaking 
in terms of ‘actual’ time versus apparent time, as Tognazzini 
does (p. 359), we could see these different times as belong-
ing to one reality, not understood as a static world but as a 
process or a combination of processes.
Second, in order to move beyond dualistic thinking about 
these experiences but still distinguish between the experi-
ence and actions of designers and those of users/spectators, 
one could also talk about two narratives, which may or 
may not interlock at different times. There is the narrative 
of the magician/designer, including a plot with a character 
(the magician as artist, craftsman, scientist, and so on) and 
events happening (e.g. the coin is moved into the pocket of 
one’s jacket). There is also the narrative of the spectators, 
1 The position is influenced by thinkers in 20th century philosophy 
who have questioned dualism such as Dewey and Wittgenstein; it is 
also influenced by Bergson and by Ricoeur. Latour and Pickering are 
also to be mentioned. However, for the purpose of this paper I will 
focus on the articulation and construction of my working alternative 
position in response to Tognazzini rather than on interpretation of 
their work, and only mention some of these authors in passing when 
directly relevant for the argument.
Footnote 1 (continued)
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which in the cases of “deception” under consideration in 
this paper tends to differ from the narrative of the magician/
designer, but also has a narrative structure which involves a 
plot with characters, including the magician as magician, as 
a supernatural being [indeed Tognazzini says that the magi-
cian plays a ‘character’ (p. 361)], and events such as the 
disappearance of a person. In a dualist framework, this play 
is put in terms of the “real” narrative versus the “illusory” 
narrative. But one could also see two narratives, without 
giving one ontological priority.
Moreover, the two narratives may be entangled to some 
extent and in any case they are connected. If a person uses 
a robot as companion, the narrative of personal companion-
ship and the narrative of the computer program running the 
robot may be very different, but in practice, in use and expe-
rience, they are connected. Sometimes narratives merge, as 
in augmented reality or alternate reality games. Consider 
for instance the game Pokémon Go, which involves people 
searching for fantasy characters outside on the streets using 
their smartphone. There is the narrative of searching for 
Pokémon creatures and there is the narrative of the gamer 
crossing the street. Both narratives combine if and when 
the gamer crosses the street in order to look for the creature. 
Thus, if we consider the use, experience and phenomenology 
of the gamer (rather than taking a third person perspective), 
there is a sense in which there is one narrative.
In addition, this one narrative is connected with the nar-
rative of the code running the application, which makes pos-
sible the game narrative. Indeed, it must be emphasized here 
that the narratives and the times of the gamers are configured 
by the technology; these ICTs are what Coeckelbergh and 
Reijers, influenced by Ricoeur, have called ‘narrative tech-
nologies’ (Coeckelbergh and Reijers 2016): like a text, they 
configure characters and events into a meaningful whole. 
The text of the code thus acts as a kind of author or at least 
co-author of the narrative of the gamer. But neither the nar-
rative of the code nor the narrative of the gamer is more 
“real”, and the narrative of the game and the narrative of the 
gamer mix, without that it can be said that the one is more 
“real” than the other. One can use these terms from a third 
person perspective, of course, but if one tries to describe 
what happens by using the terms “real” and “illusion”, it is 
difficult to make sense of the experience of the gamer, who 
does not see his crossing of the street or his interaction with 
the robot as illusory; rather, there is one unified, integral 
experience. In the phenomenology of the game play (and the 
phenomenology of human-robot interaction, use of speaking 
computer interfaces etc.) there is no Platonic dualism; there 
is one game experience and one use experience.
Third, to further elaborate this approach one could also 
use the term performance. The metaphor of stage magic and 
illusionism of course already hints at performance. Indeed, 
Tognazzini writes:
Magicians work to produce illusions, but they don’t 
call their stage presentation an illusion, they call it an 
act (Tognazzini 1993, p. 356)
Now we can use this part of the metaphor and have 
it do some philosophical work, which again differs from 
the Platonic scheme Tognazzini uses. Following his own 
advice in the quote above, we can replace the language 
of reality and illusion by that of performance and act. 
There is one act, one performance. Or perhaps there are 
two performances, one done by the magician/designer and 
one done by the spectator and user, who also performs. 
Or, perhaps still better: there is one co-performance, in 
which both the designer/performer and the user/performer 
participate. Indeed, what is missing in the account pre-
sented by Tognazzini is the user/spectator in a more active 
role. In the Platonic cave metaphor/narrative, the prison-
ers are passive. They watch. They are even immobilized. 
Similarly, in Tognazzini’s account, the spectator is also 
relatively passive. In the magician’ show, spectators are 
literally immobile, sitting on a chair. With a few excep-
tions they do not participate in the performance. And it is 
assumed that the creation of the illusion is entirely taking 
place on the side of the magician. But this is misleading 
for at least two related reasons. First, consider again stage 
magic and illusionism, the metaphor itself. Performance 
can be seen as a one-way affair, but we can also take a dif-
ferent view, according to which the spectator does not pas-
sively receive meaning from the magician, but actively co-
constructs time, narrative, and performance. In that sense, 
the spectator is indeed co-performer. Without the specta-
tor, there is no act, no performance. To the extent that this 
is hidden by the metaphor of stage magic, the metaphor 
has its limitations. But an appropriate understanding of 
what is happening here and a better understanding of the 
metaphor itself reveals this more active role of the specta-
tor. Second, consider now use of ICTs. The metaphor of 
stage magic almost hides that ICTs are used and that it 
is part of practices. Users are not (mere) spectators; they 
do something, they perform. The alternative approach I 
articulate here and its temporal, narrative, and performa-
tive turn away from Platonism, is only possible by con-
sidering ICTs in their use and experience. It is only by 
considering ICTS in their use and experience that the real/
illusion is overcome. If we only look at design, as Tognaz-
zini and others do, then we miss this aspect and easily 
remain within the Platonic framework, which in practice is 
shared by many designers, engineers, and scientists work-
ing in fields such as social robotics, engineering, and so 
on, but also by many philosophers. Then we see what is 
happening from a third person point of view. But we need 
to move beyond the language of “a view”, and especially 
an outside view. There are processes, there are narratives, 
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and there are performances, in which not only designers 
but also users are actively involved. Once we consider the 
performance and experience of the user of devices that 
“deceive”, the Platonic way of thinking evaporates. Then 
we see that there are techniques and technological artefacts 
used by designers, but also that there are techniques and 
artefacts used by the users of ICTs.
For example, if a person uses a robot as a companion, 
then we may distinguish between at least the following per-
formances: there is the performance of the designer, who 
writes the code using a computer and computer programs, 
but there is also the performance of the user, who uses the 
robot, and there is the performance of the robot, which 
may use all kinds of artefacts. All these uses, experiences, 
and performances are part of a whole, they are connected 
through time and narrative, and through artefacts (especially 
the robot). There is also the performance of the company 
who wants data from the user. Now all these performances 
are “real”, and they involve various kinds of techniques, bod-
ies, and artefacts. To describe what is going on only in terms 
of a deception designed by the designer/magician reduces 
a rich holistic performative configuration and process to 
only one performance, and—by using the term deception—
gives ontological priority to one particular performance 
as opposed to others. Similarly, to focus on what the robot 
“really” “is” as opposed to the “illusion”, is to blind the 
analysis to all kinds of relations between this robot and vari-
ous performances. The robot is embedded in narratives-in-
the-making, there are processes and performances. If there is 
a reality at all, it is not a static “world” which we can “view” 
but a process-reality that is made and performed.
Moreover, as the “narrative technologies” approach men-
tioned already suggested, technology plays a more “active” 
role in these processes, narratives, and performances. Con-
sider also Pickering’s reading of Latour (1993): Pickering 
argued that there is human and material agency (p. 21), that 
humans and machines ‘collaborate in performances’ (p. 16) 
and that there is ‘interplay here between the emergence 
of material agency and the construction of human goals’ 
(p. 56). This gives us a different view of stage magic and 
of the use of ICTs, in which the magician/designer is no 
longer totally in control of the performances. Instead, both 
users and machines co-write the narratives, co-configure the 
time/experience of the user, and co-perform. At a meta-level, 
then, instead of talking to the all-knowing Platonic philoso-
pher in order to understand what is going on, we have to take 
advice from the users and performers: the magician/designer 
as user of technology and as performer, but also the users of 
technology, the performers of technology.
To conclude, according to this more holistic and rela-
tional alternative approach that takes a narrative and per-
formative turn, instead of asking “What is real and what is 
illusory?” (the Platonic question), now the main question is 
“What is going on?”, understood here as: what is going on 
in terms of time, narrative, and performance. This gives us 
a novel way of looking at the “deception” issue. If there is 
“deception” and “illusion” at all, it is a deception and illu-
sion that are made in performances, and that are co-created 
and co-performed by humans (magician/designer and spec-
tator/user) and non-humans (robots and other machines, 
artefacts, and devices).
This gives us a different approach to “deception” phe-
nomena than, say Turkle’s or Sparrow and Sparrow’s, and 
suggests not only that we can dispense with a derogatory 
view of performance, but also that we do not need to use 
the language of deception. First, in contrast to Turkle’s use 
of the term, here performance is not seen as a negative term 
indicating illusion, but, decoupled from deception, magic, 
and illusion, it becomes a morally neutral process which 
involves humans and non-humans. Second, there may still 
be an ethical problem with robots that “pretend” having feel-
ings, but this phenomenon and indeed problem, should not 
be framed in terms of pretence or illusion or “performance” 
as a negative and derogatory term, but in terms of perfor-
mance as a morally neutral term to metaphysically bring 
together humans, and humans and non-humans. Humans 
and technologies co-perform and co-stage something here. 
Now in some cases this performance can rightly be seen as 
problematic: not because there are two different realities, 
but because there may be a problem with the performance 
and its consequences, or one could say that there are two 
conflicting performances. Let me unpack this.
What happens in so-called “deception” cases is that, one 
the one hand, the performance is successful, for instance in 
creating a robot with emotions. If the performance is suc-
cessful, then in the experience of the viewer/user, there is 
not the “appearance” of emotions, there are emotions. On 
the other hand, at a different point in time or when viewed 
from the outside, the performance fails: it fails if and when 
others (e.g. philosophers or the same users at another time) 
think and say these emotions are not real (which is also a 
performance, one which uses language). Success and fail-
ure might also happen with regard to different groups at the 
same time. One group of users may experience the perfor-
mance as successful, whereas another group of users may 
experience the same performance as unsuccessful. In such 
cases, instead of a deception problem, we have a perfor-
mance problem: it is not entirely successful. This need not be 
problematic if everyone knows it was a show anyway; but it 
is problematic if the claim was that for instance the machine 
has emotions. Moreover, use of the language of deception 
is itself a performance, a counter-performance so to speak, 
which does not stand outside the performative field. In the 
case of the different user groups, one could say that there are 
different kinds of performances, and the term “deception” is 
used in a third performance to mark the difference between 
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the successful and the unsuccessful performance. One can 
also reframe the problem in narrative terms: what is missing 
here is not “the real” as opposed to “illusion”, but success 
or failure on the part of the designer and the robot—but 
also the user/spectator—to co-write a particular narrative, 
for instance a love narrative or a companion narrative. Or 
again there may be two conflicting narratives: one about love 
and one about deception. The ethical question then concerns 
the ethical quality and consequences of these performances 
and narratives (and indeed of this “battle” of performances 
and narratives) for the people involved. Is it good that young 
children get involved in a narrative of companionship with a 
robot? Is it good that a particular adult co-performs sex with 
a robot? Is it good that elderly persons with limited cognitive 
abilities become involved in a performance of care in which 
robots play a specific role? To answer these questions does 
not require a discussion of metaphysics or does not need 
framing in terms of deception; it requires us to attend to the 
specific human–robot interaction as a performative and nar-
rative process in which the experience and co-performance 
of users counts. There may well be a difference between 
performances and also a difference in ethical quality, but 
that difference is a matter of (relational) phenomenology, 
of experience-in-relation and experience-in-performance; 
it is not a metaphysical or theoretical-scientific difference 
between what the robot can do and not do (the properties of 
the robot), the reality of the world, the nature of emotions, 
and so on.
A relational turn
This move also invite us to connect with a relational 
approach to human-robot interaction (e.g. Coeckelbergh 
2012, 2014), which enables us to criticize the distancing 
of the deception language. Those who use deception lan-
guage or assume and real/illusion distinction tend to take 
what Nagel called a “view from nowhere”. While in general 
a third person point of view may not necessarily be prob-
lematic and probably is unavoidable, the very distant and 
detached view of the scientist qua scientist and philosopher 
qua metaphysician is problematic since it neglects the con-
crete relation between human and robot, human and human, 
and so on. By focusing on the properties of the robot (what 
the robot can do or cannot do, what the robot is or is not, 
has or has not, e.g. emotions or not), what remains out of 
sight is the concrete relation, encounter, (co-)performance, 
and experience. The ethical quality of the performance 
and whether or not it is successful is not a matter of what 
the robot is, has, or can do, or what the user/viewer/audi-
ence is, does, and so on, but of what happens in the rela-
tion between the two, here cast as: what happens during a 
(co-)performance. In the performative process and experi-
ence, there is no robot-in-itself and no human-in-itself; both 
are co-constituted in the performance and in the relation. 
If there is a so-called “deception problem” then this must 
be understood as a relational problem: one which does not 
concern the robot but the relation between human and robot 
as performed. What happens in this relation needs ethical 
analysis and judgment. Moreover, such performance rela-
tions invite other performative interventions such as the 
voice of the designer-roboticist, the philosopher-ethicist, 
and so on who may or may not use the language of decep-
tion as a performative gesture—interventions which does not 
stand outside the performative field, and could themselves 
be criticized, for instance as involving too much distance. 
The so-called “deception” issue is then not about “the real” 
or about what emotions “are” but is rather a problem con-
cerning the performances and narratives humans and robots 
create and should (not) create in specific cases, situations, 
and contexts, and about the ethical quality and consequences 
of these performances and narratives.
Thus, the advantage of this re-description and re-evalu-
ation in performative and relational terms is that it is now 
possible to ethically evaluate the relational process, perfor-
mance, and experience itself, indeed the relation itself and 
its consequences, without having to involve a third distant 
metaphysical entity such as “reality” (the real world, real 
emotions, etc.), the “nature” of emotions, etc. or abstract 
scientific-theoretical concepts such as anthropomorphism, 
which blind us to the quality concrete relation, encounter, 
and performance. Of course roboticists, human–robot inter-
action scholars, ethicists of robotics, etc. often also start 
from the concrete experience. But they then take distance 
and turn these into “cases” with their theories and gener-
alizations. And when, in their evaluative moments, they use 
deception language or make Platonic assumptions, their use 
of language takes distance from the concrete performative-
narrative and relational process, and to the extent that they 
do this, their performance becomes itself problematic.
These qualifications are important: the aim of my pro-
posal to use a different language—that of performance, nar-
rative, and relations—is not to discredit the work of authors 
such as Turkle, the Sparrows, and so on as invalid, entirely 
wrong-headed, and so on. Generally, these authors pay a 
lot of attention to the concrete human–robot interactions, 
especially Turkle for instance. My “only” suggestion is that 
those interested in better understanding and evaluating con-
temporary (social) robotics need to be careful and critical 
when using terms such as deception, when using scientific 
methods and theories, and when assuming metaphysical dis-
tinctions concerning the real etc., and consider using alterna-
tive terms that do more justice to performative and relational 
experience—experience on the part of all people involved. 
This includes users, but also designers/engineers, roboticists, 
philosophers, social scientists, etc., since they may also be 
involved and co-create different performances and narratives 
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with robots. Hence they cannot assume the role of “neutral” 
and distant observer; they themselves, with their science, 
criticsm, interventions, gestures, etc. (which are also perfor-
mances) influence and even co-constitute the performance, 
relation, and their meanings and ethical consequences.
To conclude, I have proposed to re-frame and further 
analyze the “deception” problem by using the notions of 
performances, narratives, and relations, which may help to 
avoid assumptions and discussions concerning for instance 
a metaphysics of the real, what robots can do, what emo-
tions really are, etc. and which brings the discussion back 
to human-robot use and interaction as an experiential and 
performative-narrative process which must be analysed and 
evaluated in terms of the quality and consequences of its 
performances and experiences, including ethical quality. As 
scientist or philosophers we can do this from a third person 
point of view, if we must, but then we need to make sure that 
it is one that stays close to the phenomena and starts from 
there to develop a better understanding and, if necessary, 
an ethical judgment. And although an increasing amount of 
researchers may seem to do this, there is always the danger 
of a too distant theoretical or metaphysical attitude. Moreo-
ver, the arguments and discussion presented so far, with all 
its difficulties and potential pitfalls, suggests that we are 
only in the beginning of achieving a better understanding 
of the phenomena. I have argued that the moral language 
of “deception” and “illusion” may hinder rather than help 
in this process.
Now what does this approach mean for ethics of ICTs? 
And what does it imply for ICT design and use?
Implications for the ethics of, and responsibility 
for, ICT design and use: from an ethics 
of deception to an ethics of co‑performance
Let me first outline an ethics in the spirit of Tognazzini, 
which retains the language of deception, but uses deception 
in a less derogatory or negative way. Such an ethics would 
be a kind of virtue ethics, in particular an ethics of honesty. 
The ethics of honesty demands from designers to be hon-
est about their robot, their speaking app, their game, etc. It 
requires from them, instead of hiding what they do, to design 
their robots in such a way that it is clear that it is a machine, 
a piece of technology, a game created by apparatus, etc. It 
requires them to make sure that there is a magician at work, 
who tricks users. The virtuous designer, then, is a Platonist 
magician who uses techniques and artefacts to entertain, but 
who knows the full truth and when the performance is over 
goes back into the cave to liberate the prisoners-spectators. 
Or rather, before imprisoning them, before the show starts, 
and perhaps even during the show, she makes sure that 
people are aware that all this is only trickery. This actually 
requires from designers to take on a double role: that of the 
illusionist and that of the de-illusionist. On the one hand, 
the designer (and especially the company) needs to sell the 
device as magic. This is the attraction. It is also what people 
want. They want the show. For instance, someone using a 
virtual reality device to play games wants to be immersed 
in that game and want to be “fooled”. On the other hand, 
the designer also needs to reveal the tricks, or at least needs 
to reveal that it is a trick. Arguably this is often lacking in 
current robotics. Perhaps in the lab researchers are happy to 
show their tricks; but the robots sold on the market inten-
tionally hide their tricks. They are meant to be magic, they 
are advertised to be magic, and generally the tricks are not 
visible and not transparent. Based on the ethics of honesty, 
one could demand more transparency.
This ethics is very attractive, and from this point of view 
it would be good if designers where to take it up, as com-
pared to what, according to this approach, are the “lies” of 
social robotics, speaking machines, alternate reality games, 
etc. This ethics is compatible with an ethics of the right, 
which tells us that is not right to deceive. It is also compat-
ible with a virtue ethics focused on honesty.
However, in the previous section I have complicated the 
picture. I have made it plausible that there is another, non-
Platonic and less dualist and more relational way of think-
ing about the issue of deception and ICT, which calls for 
evaluating the use of (social) robots not in terms of “decep-
tion” but in terms of the success and ethical quality of the 
performances and their consequences. We should have a 
discussion about which narrative and performance we want 
(rather than about what is real and what is illusion) in which 
contexts and for which people. For instance, we may want 
robots to perform “machine” roles but not “lover” roles. We 
may want a performance of mowing the lawn, but not a per-
formance of “friendship”. Or we may be fine with friendship 
with robots narratives for adults but not for young children. 
Once we drop the language of deception and the related real/
unreal distinction, the ethical analysis must then evaluate not 
whether a particular phenomenon is real or not, but instead 
whether the performance, understood as a relational pro-
cess, is good—in its success, quality, and consequences. As 
it stands, there seem to be good arguments why machines 
cannot be good performers when it comes to feeling, love, 
and all that is needed for good relationship performances and 
relationship narratives. It seems that they fail. Now at this 
point one may take again a more theoretical attitude and for 
instance consider Dreyfus’s philosophical criticisms of AI 
here or seek advice from the scientists: even within robotics 
and within a computational paradigm most roboticists rec-
ognize limits. For instance, Matthias Scheutz has argued that 
robots lack ‘the architectural and computational mechanisms 
that would allow them to care, largely because we do not 
even know what it takes, computationally, for a system to 
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care about anything’ (Scheutz 2011). However, these distant 
theoretical approaches are problematic; the “proof” here is 
not a matter of concepts or theory, but of performance. The 
proposed approach would frame these reasons not in terms 
of the reality or properties of the robot (its having emotions 
or not for instance) or in terms of what robots can and can-
not do, theoretically speaking [to use Dreyfus’s famous title 
(Dreyfus 1992)]. It would re-frame these reasons in terms 
of its performance itself. Which “capacities” the robot has 
depends on performance, which is a relational and expe-
riential matter: it always involves human subjectivity and 
experience, in relation to the artefact. What robots “are” 
depends on those relations and experiences, and the game 
of defining the properties and nature of machines is itself a 
particular performance, which should not escape criticism.
Thus, an ethics of performance is called for, which evalu-
ates which performances and consequences of these perfor-
mances are right and good—which then of course depends 
on how once defines right and good, or rather, how one expe-
riences right and good. Designers, then, are responsible for 
the performances of the machines they design. And scien-
tists and philosophers are responsible for their performances, 
which are not neutral, so-called “objective” interventions. 
However, when it comes to design one should not only put 
the responsibility on the part of the designers: when users 
and perhaps even machines are co-performers, then ethics 
can no longer be one that assumes that full responsibility 
lies only with the magician/designer. Indeed, if we follow 
this alternative route I think there are at least the following 
implications for the responsibility with regard to ethics of 
ICTs, which now can be understood as concerning an ethics 
of deception rather than an ethics against deception, or bet-
ter: an ethics of performance rather than an ethics against 
performance. Let me unpack these claims.
First, designers of ICT are responsible for their design 
performances, which result in uses of artefacts and perfor-
mances (by the artefacts they designed and by users) and 
in specific narratives and configurations of the time of the 
users. The ethical question then is no longer “Are you hon-
est about what you do?” but is rather: “What kind of narra-
tives do you create and what kind of performances do you 
enable by designing the technology in such and such a way?” 
And what are the short-term and long-term consequences 
of these narratives and performances? These narratives and 
performances can then be evaluated by ethical criteria and 
theories, for instance by means of a virtue ethics, where 
the question is: “What kind of characters—human and non-
human—and what kind of events and plots do you create?” 
Designers of the ICTs considered in this paper should then 
be held responsible, not so much for how honest they are 
with regard to what they are doing but rather for the ethical 
consequences of their designs for the characters and lives 
of people, which as uses of technology, as experiences, as 
(co-)performances, and as narratives, are configured and 
reconfigured by the technologies they designed. The main 
ethical problem and challenge directed at the designer/magi-
cian is then not “Is this a show or not, is this trickery or not? 
Are you fooling us?!”; we generally know and accept that 
there is a show, we know that there is trickery, we know that 
human social life is a performance and that use of technol-
ogy is a performance. Rather, the question with regard to 
ICT design is: “Given that you use all these tricks and tech-
niques, given that you co-shape our performances and our 
narratives, given that the shows goes on and that the show 
must go on (given that, in this view, there is no “outside” to 
performance and no outside to technology-in-use), how can 
we ensure that these narratives and performances and their 
consequences are good—according to a particular definition 
of “good”?”
Indeed, let me note again that the approach presented here 
is compatible with an ethics of good and an ethics of the 
good life, and is open to various definition of “good” and 
the “good life”, provided that theories involved are compat-
ible with a relational, narrative and performative turn. It is 
assumed here that “good” is not something that is detached 
from experience and wisdom in concrete practical perfor-
mances and lived narratives. It is also compatible with narra-
tive ethics and virtue ethics, but then a virtue ethics that does 
not only exclaim that we should be honest, but re-defines 
honesty and other virtues starting from the assumption that 
design is about performance, and that character is “made” in 
such performances and not merely the result of human will 
or intention; it is also co-configured by the technologies and 
techniques used in these performances (more work is needed 
to develop this point).
Second, however, since as argued users co-write these 
narratives and co-perform them, since they are part of the 
magic performance as co-authors and indeed co-magi-
cians, they are also responsible. Design is often defined 
in terms of intention, plan, aim, and so on (Flusser 1999, 
p. 17). But if the magician/designer is no longer in full 
control of the show and if the show crucially depends on 
the users as co-performers, the responsibility of the magi-
cian/designer is limited, both in terms of the success of the 
performance and in terms of the ethical quality of the per-
formance. If we no longer see users as passive receptors of 
whatever the designer has in mind and intends, then they 
should also be held responsible for the show. Moreover, 
that responsibility is also limited: both the designer and 
the user have to accept that the resulting performances 
and narratives are not entirely under their control. As I 
indicated before, there may be unintended consequences. 
For design, this means that the design should be “open” 
enough to enable and allow different kinds of uses (that 
is, co-performances by users), and that it should take into 
account unintended consequences as much as possible, for 
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instance by means of creating and evaluating all kinds of 
(worst case) scenarios.
Moreover, a relational view also means that we should 
look beyond individual users as co-performers: we should 
also consider relations within families, groups, wider soci-
ety. Performances are always part of a larger whole, and 
are normatively embedded in, and shaped by, these larger 
wholes (see also Coeckelbergh 2017). Here too there could 
be unintended consequences for, say, society as a whole—
consequences which are normatively relevant. In the last 
section, I will say more about the politics of ICT design.
Finally, these unintended consequences have at least 
partly to do with the more “active” role of technology. If, in 
line with contemporary philosophy of technology includ-
ing the “narrative technologies” approach mentioned here, 
in line with approaches in STS such as those inspired by 
Latour’s work, and in contrast to Tognazinni and his many 
colleagues-designers and entrepreneurs, see technology not 
as “passive” artefacts that are mere instruments of the will 
and intention of the magician/designer but rather as co-
performers and co-authors of the magical narratives and 
illusionist performances under considerations, then this 
raises the question if machines can also be co-responsible. 
Through the magic, machines increasingly appear as such. 
In practice, people will be increasingly drawn into perfor-
mances that tempt them to acknowledge the virtual respon-
sibility (Coeckelbergh 2009) of machines. However, it 
would be ethically problematic to confuse the performance 
of agency with the performance of responsibility; the latter, 
if attempted, fails in the case of robots. When machines try 
to do a “responsibility” performance, they fail. We experi-
ence that failure. We do not receive a response. The machine 
performs a reaction.
That being said, the role of the mentioned technologies is 
more than that of passive instruments; they also “act” in all 
kinds of ways—with Akrich and Latour we could call them 
‘actants’ (Akrich and Latour 1992, p. 259)—even if they 
cannot pull off the act of response (as opposed to reaction). 
Humans must remain responsible. In contrast to Latour, 
who has a symmetrical view, I propose an assymetrial view: 
humans are the main performers, even if they are not the 
only performers. But as co-performers and as experiencers 
of the performance—as designer or as user—they are crucial 
and irreplaceable. They are always part of the relation. To 
fully support and justify this view, however, would lead me 
into a different discussion; it would require another philo-
sophical performance.
For now I conclude that the ethical discussion of cases 
and ICTs of “deception” could be enhanced by looking at 
it through the lens of stage magic and illusion, that phi-
losophers of technology could learn from relevant work on 
this by designers and scientist in the field of ICT, that this 
angle leads us to consider large metaphysical and ethical 
questions, and that this paper has mapped and articulated 
two positions, which involve different approaches to the 
question concerning the real and which enable us to ask dif-
ferent and interesting ethical questions about the magic and 
trickery of contemporary and near-future ICTs such as com-
panion robots, talking machines, and games and other tech-
nologies that leave the “virtual” world and enter the streets.
Let me now end this paper by trying to further think 
through the approach explored and articulated in this paper, 
and explore what it means for politics, in particular the poli-
tics of ICT design and use.
Illusio ex machina and the political promise 
of Ulysses’ trickery: political deception 
and political performances
Does the previous discussion ask for a ban on using the term 
deception? Maybe the term can still be “saved” if we release 
it from its metaphysical and theoretical burdens, and inter-
pret it in a performative way according to the approach I 
proposed. Then we can say that we need an ethics of decep-
tion, interpreted not as one that is concerned with reality 
versus illusion, but one that is about the right and good per-
formance. Then we can keep the alternative approach, but 
still use the term deception if we want, for instance to make 
the link with magicians’ practices. However, to avoid confu-
sion with the dualist and metaphysical approach I criticized, 
I propose to use the term performance.
This issue is also relevant when we consider the politics 
of design, to which I now turn. One reason for why it might 
be wise not to entirely ban the term “deception” from a dis-
cussion of design of ICTs, in particular design of machines, 
is that the meaning of “machines” is etymologically related 
to deception. In his philosophy of design, Flusser (1999) 
reminds us that the noun design is often connected with 
cunning and deception—a connotation which interestingly 
also applies to the term machines:
The word occurs in contexts associated with cun-
ning and deceit. A designer is a cunning plotter lay-
ing his traps. Falling into the same category are other 
vary significant words: in particular, mechanics and 
machine. The Greek mechos means a device designed 
to deceive—i.e. a trap—and the Trojan Horse is one 
example of this. Ulysses is called polymechanikos, 
which schoolchildren translate as ‘the crafty one’. 
The word mechos itself derives from the ancient 
MAGH, which we recognize in the German Macht and 
mögen, the English ‘might’ and ‘may’. Consequently, 
a machine is a device designed to deceive; a lever, for 
instance, cheats gravity, and ‘mechanics’ is the trick of 
fooling heavy bodies (Flusser 1999, p. 17)
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The design of machine technology, then, can itself be 
defined as the art (techne) of deception. The ethical question 
is then not if designers should deceive, it seems, but rather 
what kind of traps, cheats, deceits, and fooling we need and 
want—to deceive ourselves and have ourselves deceived. 
This is in line with the alternative approach I explored in 
this paper, at least if we then take the step of re-casting this 
deception narrative in terms of performance: a designer is 
a craftsperson who designs machines—this design is by 
itself a performance—that enable a particular kinds of per-
formances with nature and with others. A good designer, 
then, is a cunning performer who enables others to do tricky 
performances.
Moreover, Flusser’s etymological note also raises the 
question of power: the magician/designer is also the one 
who is able to do something, perform something, who has 
the power to do something—with power understood as a 
capacity and a potential (in German: Vermögen), in particu-
lar here: the capacity to perform. This raises the political 
questions regarding the design of technology. Put in the 
language of deception, we can ask: given that design is all 
about deception, who has the capacity to deceive, who has 
more capacity to deceive than others, and who deceives 
whom? Who should have the capacity and opportunity to 
deceive? Put in the language of performance, this becomes: 
who performs with whom, and who lets other perform what? 
Who has how much capacity and power, the Vermögen, to 
perform, in particular contexts and with regard to particular 
aims and projects?
Now when it comes to a normative position, the language 
of deception once again offers the temptation to revert back 
to the ethics of honesty, and avoid these questions by say-
ing that one should not deceive in the first place. The eth-
ics of honesty seems to require a politics of transparency 
and de-masking, which is aimed at revealing the tricks and 
deception of the designers and politicians, and at democracy 
as requiring, among other things, to make all knowledge 
involved transparent. Again, there is a lot to say for such an 
approach and such a normative orientation. It is in line with 
the intuitions of many—including some of my own. How-
ever, if we start from the different assumptions and approach 
articulated in this paper, what are the consequences for 
thinking about the politics of ICTs and, more generally, the 
politics of technology?
If we acknowledge, with Flusser, that technology 
deceives, and if we acknowledge that technology is unavoid-
ably used for manipulation of other people, then we may ask 
different questions. If technology is defined as a psychologi-
cal weapon to exert control over other human beings (Gell 
1994, p. 1988), or if we accept, perhaps inspired by Foucault 
(1975), that there is always going to be disciplining in soci-
ety, then we may still ask ethical and political questions: 
questions which do not concern if there is deception and 
manipulation or if deception in general is bad, but rather ask 
who deceives and manipulates whom, which deceptions are 
good, and put in the language of performance: who man-
ages to have others perform for them, and which kind of 
manipulative and disciplining performances are acceptable 
and good.
There are of course plenty of criteria in moral and politi-
cal philosophy for what is acceptable and good, and some of 
them have been applied in robot ethics. For instance, Spar-
row (2016) has evaluated technology in aged care accord-
ing to what he believes are objective elements of welfare. 
All these criteria and discussions are not rendered obsolete 
by the approached I propose. But now they perform a new 
function: as criteria to evaluate performance. For instance, 
one may ask: Is the co-performance of a particular health 
care robot contributing to the welfare of the residents of 
this elderly care home, according to criteria for welfare as 
defined by Sparrow? Then the question is not about decep-
tion but about the quality and ethical consequences of the 
performance. These criteria may allow for some kinds of 
manipulations but not for others.
To show what this means in the context of political prin-
ciples, let me here focus on the political ideal of democ-
racy. The alternative ethics presented in this paper, when 
connected with a democratic ideal, suggests a different 
normative position, which does not avoid but answers the 
question “who should have the capacity and opportunity to 
deceive?” The democratic answer here, it seems, is that not 
only responsibility but also power should be distributed to 
both designers and users. If we are going to have to play the 
game of deception at all, so this position goes, then users 
should also have a hand in it. Of course, if users already play 
the game and co-perform, as I argued, then in a sense they 
already have power, then all of us already have power. If they 
had no power at all, they could not exercise their responsibil-
ity, and indeed the question of responsibility would not come 
up in the first place. Yet while this is the case for all users, it 
is more the case for some users than for others. For instance, 
people who know how to code seem to have more design 
power (understood as deception power or manipulative 
power) and more performance power with regard to ICTs 
than others, based on their skills. And today there are many 
users/designers, “hackers”, who assume more power than 
initially given to them by the designers—again since they are 
more skilled, have more know-how to deceive than others. 
They know how to design their Trojan horses. Thus, there is 
still inequality in this respect; some people have more skills 
and hence power than others. Now one could say that it is 
up to users to acquire more skills. But neither technology 
nor its social context should be seen as a given. There may 
be power structures in society that give more opportunities 
to some people than to others. Some have more power to 
do some performances or to have others perform for them. 
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And even if we all had the same skills, there might be still 
social mechanisms through which some people get more 
opportunities and more power to deceive/design than others. 
Perhaps it should be a meta-ethical duty for designers and 
politicians to design technologies and social structures that 
create enough room for the self-empowerment of all persons 
as citizens-users. The guiding normative-political ideal here, 
again based on the ideal of democracy and the alternative 
approach articulated in this paper, is that deceit is only prob-
lematic if it is in the hands of one person or one group of 
people. Deceit and self-deceit by means of technology and 
by other means, then, is not a problem as long as the power 
to do so is democratized (and as long as ethical criteria are 
satisfied). The political promise of the democratic ideal is 
then translated into the hope that we can all become bet-
ter, more skilful and more powerful magician-designers and 
magician-performers, that we can all become Ulysses. Alter-
natively, if we drop the vocabulary of illusion and deception 
and leave an individualist framework, we could say that the 
political promise is that we can all become better (co-)per-
formers, and that we can better perform together. Whether or 
not we call it deceit or trickery, there is not only the option 
of the lone hero; there is also the possibility of achieving the 
cunning intelligence of collaborative performance.
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